November 5, 1862 - Wednesday - 160 years ago today

Status - John Baer - 40th Indiana Regiment - Crittenden's Corps - Wood's Division - Wagner's Brigade

General Rosecrans during this time is attempting to remedy several shortcomings he has found in the army, such as lack of arms for various units, issues regarding discipline including conducting courts-martial, and finding needed cavalry to contest the Confederate cavalry still in the area.

Crittenden's corps on the 3rd is ordered to move from Glasgow, KY toward Gallatin, TN as soon as practicable.   Below is the order:

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BOWLING GREEN,  November 3, 1862

Major-General Crittenden,

  The general commanding directs that you move your command from Glasgow to Scottsvile or in the vicinity of Gallatin, with five days' rations, three in haversacks.  Camp where there are wood, water and forage.  Having done so, push scouts quietly over toward the east, and ascertain all the information possible of the enemy and the country,  With regard to subsistence, leave orders for Smith to halt at Glasgow until stores are supplied them; then to move on.  Keep up your communications and supplies.  A depot for the latter will be established at or below Mitchellsville.

ARTHUR C. DUCAT, 

Lieutenat-Colonel and Acting Chief of Staff.

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Below is a map of the area, Glasgow is upper right, Scottsville center, and Gallatin lower left-center.  Mitchellville (misspelled in dispatch) is just north of Portland, TN., at left.

 

In the east, President Lincoln finally relieves General McClellan of all commands and appoints General Burnside in his place.  This changes was due to lack of any movement to attack Confederate forces in Virginia. Burnside will be expected to soon go over to the attack, as will General Rosecrans in Tennessee.

 

More Information:

• Link: War Operations, see Volume XX, Chapter XXXII, Part II, Correspondence,  pp. 5-12.
• The Civil War Day by Day, John S. Bowman, Ed. p. 87.
  
• Shelby Foote: The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 741-757. 
• Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol 3. The Tide Shifts, pp, 600-603.
• Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, pp. 1-19.
  

 

NEXT POST: NOVEMBER 9TH

November 1, 1862 - Saturday - 160 years ago today

Status - John Baer - 40th Indiana Regiment - Crittenden's Corps - Wood's Division - Wagner's Brigade

Buell is relieved by Rosecrans officially on the 30th and is ordered to Indianapolis to await further orders.  The western governors are pleased as they have urged Buell's removal for some months.  A commission is being set up by the Secretary of War to investigate Buell's conduct of his department in the preceding months.

A new Department of the Cumberland is created for General Rosecrans.  The Department of the Ohio, under General Wright, continues to overlap the new department and cause confusion.  Troops are being requested to be sent further west to General Grant in West Tennessee and Mississippi; he is preparing to move on Vicksburg, MS.  Its capture would clear the Mississippi River for Union navigation.

Rosecrans continues the troop movements that were in progress under General Buell.  Crittenden's corps is likely near Glasgow, KY as was previously ordered.  There are mixed reports from Nashville as to how many Confederate troops are in the area, but these are concerning enough that Rosecrans will move the army there just as Buell had proposed.

More Information:

• Link: War Operations, see Volume XVI, Chapter XXVIII, Part II, Correspondence,  pp. 651-670.
• Link: War Operations, see Volume XX, Chapter XXXII, Part II, Correspondence,  pp. 3-5.
• The Civil War Day by Day, John S. Bowman, Ed. p. 87.
  
• Shelby Foote: The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 741-744. 
• Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol 3. The Tide Shifts, pp, 600-603.
• Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, pp. 1-19.
  

 

NEXT POST: NOVEMBER 5TH

 

October 28, 1862 - Tuesday - 160 years ago today

Status - John Baer - 40th Indiana Regiment - Crittenden's Corps - Wood's Division - Wagner's Brigade

Crittenden's corps has been ordered to have reached the Glasgow, KY area by the 31st and is moving in that directions from London, KY where their pursuit of the Rebel army was discontinued.

By the 28th, Buell is still not aware of his own dismissal, as General Rosecrans has not yet reached his headquarters with the relevant orders.  He was continuing the move toward Nashville with plans to move on the Confederate army now gathering at Murfreesboro, while also making deployments for the protection of Kentucky during the coming winter.

Rosecrans telegraphs on the 28th that he is leaving Cincinnati for Buell's headquarters the next morning.

More Information:

• Link: War Operations, see Volume XVI, Chapter XXVIII, Part II, Correspondence,  pp. 642-651.
• The Civil War Day by Day, John S. Bowman, Ed. p. 87.
  
• Shelby Foote: The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 741-744. 
• Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol 3. The Tide Shifts, pp, 600-603.
• Kenneth Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, pp. 341-367
• Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, pp. 1-14.
  

 

NEXT POST: NOVEMBER 1ST

October 24, 1862 - Friday - 160 years ago today

Status - John Baer - 40th Indiana Regiment - Crittenden's Corps - Wood's Division - Wagner's Brigade

Crittenden's corps had been ordered on the 21st to move to Columbia, KY, from the London, KY area, as the direct pursuit of Bragg's army was curtailed.  They are then to move to Glasgow. KY, by the 31st.  Northern Governors, including Indiana's Governor Morton, are expressing outrage that Buell is pulling back from the pursuit.

General Buell on the 22nd sent another long dispatch to Washington describing the current situation and deployments, and the issues mitigating against an attack on East Tennessee.  Halleck's return again pushes for a move eastward and against a return of the army to Nashville.

On the 23rd, Major-General William S. Rosecrans, fresh off a recent victory at Corinth, MS, is ordered to Cincinnati and the next day receives the following lengthy dispatch:

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Washington, October 19, 1862 -- 1:33 p. m.

Maj. Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, Cincinnati, Ohio:

   You will receive herewith the order of the President placing you in command of the Department of the Cumberland and of the army of operations now under Major-General Buell.

   You will immediately repair to General Buell's headquarters and relieve him from the command.

  The great objects to be kept in view in your operations in the field are: First, to drive the enemy from Kentucky and Middle Tennessee; second, to take and hold East Tennessee, cutting the line of railroad at Chattanooga, Cleveland, or Athens, so as to destroy the connection of the valley of Virginia with Georgia and the other Southern States.  It is hoped that by prompt and rapid movements a considerable part of this may be accomplished before the roads become impassible from the winter rains.

   Two modes or reaching East Tennessee have been proposed.  First, to push a small force on the rear of Bragg's army to drive him into Tennessee and move the main army on such lines as to cover Nashville; second, to go directly to Nashville and make that the base of your operations, by McMinnville or Cookville.  Adopting the first plan, the route by Somerset to Montgomery, if practicable, would be the most direct; if not practicable, it would then be necessary to move by Columbia or Glasgow to Sparta, &c.  If the second plan be adopted, you will be obliged to move twice the distance in order to reach your objective point and at the same time afford the enemy an opportunity to resume his raids into Kentucky.  Moreover, it would give the appearance of a retreat, which would encourage the enemy, while it would discourage our own troops and the country.  Nevertheless, the difficulty of the roads, the pressure of the enemy upon Nashville, the position in which you find General Buell's army, and the difficulty of supplying it in a mountainous and sparsely populated country may compel you to adopt this line.  In either case it will be necessary for you to repair and guard the railroad, so as to secure your supplies from Louisville until the Cumberland River becomes navigable.

   You will fully appreciate the importance of moving light and rapidly, and also the necessity of procuring as many of your supplies as possible in the country passed over.  Where you cannot obtain enough by purchase of loyal men or requisitions upon the disloyal you will make forced requisitions on the country, paying or receipting, as the case may be, for the supplies taken.  The time has now come when we must apply the sterner rules of war, whenever such application becomes necessary to enable us to support our armies and to move them rapidly upon the enemy.  You will not hesitate to do this in all cases where the exigencies of war require it.

   Great care, however, must be taken to prevent straggling and pillaging and a strict account must be kept of all property taken.  On this subject your attention is called to recent general orders and also to the system adopted in the French Army.

   In connection with your proposed operations in Middle and East Tennessee, a column of about 20,000 men, under General Cox, is moving up the Kanawha River, and it is hoped that they will be able to cut the railroad near Newbern or Wytheville,  This movement may possibly draw off a portion of Bragg's forces for the protection of that road.

   Moreover, if the enemy's forces in Mississippi now operating against General Grant should be drawn east to re-enforce Bragg or to operate in Tennessee General Grant may be able to render you important assistance.

   Although the Department of the Ohio covers a portion of your theater of operations this will in no respect interfere with your movements in the field nor the command of your army,  Moreover, you will call upon General Wright for any assistance or supplies which you may require.

   It is possible that Bragg, having failed of his object in Kentucky, may leave only a small force in East Tennessee and throw his main army into Mississippi against General Grant.  His railroad communications from Knoxville to Holly Springs and Tupelo will enable him to make this movement with great rapidity.  In that case a part of your forces must be sent to the assistance of General Grant, either by railroad to Decatur or by water, should the Cumberland be navigable, to Columbus or Memphis.  Every effort should be made to ascertain Bragg's movements by pressing him closely.

   I need not urge upon you the necessity of giving active employment to your forces.  Neither the country nor the Government will much longer put up with the inactivity of some of our armies and generals.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, 

General-in-Chief.

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Halleck demands the pursuit of Bragg and the liberation of East Tennessee, and denigrates Buell's plan of returning to Nashville to make that the base of operation.  None of that, of course, will relieve the new commander of the many troubles of which Buell constantly complains.  These issues will similarly frustrate Rosecrans and hamper his attempts to advance.

Here is the official order:

 

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GENERAL ORDERS No. 168

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJT, GEN.'S OFFICE,

Washington, October 24, 1862

I.  By direction of the President the State of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River and such parts of Northern Alabama and Georgia as may be taken possession of by United States troops will constitute the Department of the Cumberland.

II.  Maj. Gen. W. S. Rasecrans is assigned to the command of the Department of the Cumberland.

III.  The troops under the command of Major-General Grant will constitute the Thirteenth Army Corps, and those assigned to the command of Major-General Rosecrans will constitute the Fourteenth Army Corps.

   By order of the Secretary of War,

L. THOMAS, 

Adjutant-General.

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Buell is ordered to surrender his command and go to Indianapolis to await further orders; orders that never came.  He would sit out the remainder of the war without getting another command of any kind.  When he was recommended for a command by General Sherman later in the war, he declined, as it would mean serving under officers that he had previously outranked.

 

More Information:

• Link: War Operations, see Volume XVI, Chapter XXVIII, Part II, Correspondence,  pp. 634-642.
• The Civil War Day by Day, John S. Bowman, Ed. p. 86.
  
• Shelby Foote: The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 741-744. 
• Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol 3. The Tide Shifts, pp, 600-603.
• Kenneth Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, pp. 341-342
• Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, pp. 1-14.
  

 

NEXT POST: OCTOBER 28TH

October 20, 1862 - Monday - 160 years ago today

Status - John Baer - 40th Indiana Regiment - Crittenden's Corps - Wood's Division - Wagner's Brigade

As described in the last post, General Buell has decided not to pursue the Rebel armies into East Tennessee, and is moving toward Nashville to reinforce that city.  He is leaving troops in Kentucky to protect from cavalry raids; however, Confederate cavalry under John Morgan is at this time causing havoc there, taking Lexington and Bardstown, and destroying Union transportation as he goes.

What is seen from Washington is that the army stumbled into a bloody battle at Perryville, and is not following up the Confederate retreat.  It is not understood why a Confederate army can move to East Tennessee, and be sustained there, but a Union army cannot.  General Halleck sends a final message to Buell, urging aggressiveness toward East Tennessee, and the pursuit of a decisive battle: 

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WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, October 19, 1862 -- 1:33 p. m.

Major-General BUELL, Mount Vernon, Ky.:

  Your telegram of the 17th was received this morning, and has been laid before the President, who concurs in the views expressed in my telegram to you yesterday.  The capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You say it is in the heart of the enemy's resources; make it the heart of yours.  Your army can live there if the enemy's can.  You must in great measure live upon the country, paying for your supplies where proper and levying contributions where necessary.  I am directed by the President to say to you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while the roads are passable.  Once between the enemy and Nashville there will be no serious difficulty in reopening your communications with that place.  He does not understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and of our generals.  Once hold the valley of the Upper Tennessee, and the operations of guerillas in that State and Kentucky will soon cease.

H. W. HALLECK, 

General-in-Chief.

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More Information:

• Link: War Operations, see Volume XVI, Chapter XXVIII, Part II, Correspondence,  pp. 621-633.
• The Civil War Day by Day, John S. Bowman, Ed. p. 86.
  
• Shelby Foote: The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 726-741. 
• Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol 3. The Tide Shifts, pp, 600-603.
• Kenneth Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, pp. 73-341
• Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, pp. 1-14.
  

 

NEXT POST: OCTOBER 24TH 

January 13, 1862 - Monday - 160 years ago today

Status - John Baer - 40th Indiana Regiment

On January 13th, 1862 the 40th Indiana was in camp at Bardstown, KY, undergoing familiarization and training for the Army of the Ohio (General Buell commanding).

 War Planning

 Just before the new year, General McClellan, who was in command of all the armies, was taken sick with what was reported as typhoid fever.  President Lincoln took this opportunity to communicate directly with General Buell, and also with General Halleck, who had command in the West.

Halleck was overseeing the area from Western Kentucky to Missouri and anything further west.  Missouri was currently the largest area of concern, as there was active fighting and most of Halleck's forces were deployed there.  Halleck did not believe he could support a major movement into Kentucky at the time. Also, he did not really trust his general in Kentucky, the not-yet-famous Ulysses. S. Grant.

Lincoln was encouraging Buell to move toward East Tennessee, with an eye to capturing the railroad which was the main northern artery for the Confederacy and a critical supply line for their eastern army, and supporting the Unionists in the area.  Buell would give a nod to this but did not actually think it was feasible.  This is understandable; even today, driving Interstate 75 between Louisville and Knoxville shows the problem - a long series of high ridges and deep valleys that must be traversed.  In a time with no modern roads, and an army that would have to be supplied by wagon trains, success would be doubtful.

Buell much preferred to attack central Kentucky and Middle Tennessee through Bowling Green, KY and Nashville.  However, he believed he was facing a larger army than he actually was, and so would not move without the support from General Halleck (which, as above, was not forthcoming due to Halleck's Missouri concerns).

McClellan recovered slowly but a few days later was corresponding again.  As is well known, President Lincoln had for some time been prodding McClellan for a forward movement from the eastern army under his command.  McClellan, too, seems to have been overestimating the size of the army he was facing, and would not move forward until Buell advanced into East Tennessee and cut the railroad so as to decrease the supplies reaching the Southern army.

We can understand Lincoln's frustration with the state of affairs.  Halleck would not move into Kentucky, being occupied with Missouri; Buell would not move into East Tennessee, but he would move into Middle Tennessee if supported by Halleck, but Halleck would not support; McClellan would not go forward without Buell moving into East Tennessee, which Buell would not do.

Lincoln and his cabinet had to find funds to maintain and provision armies of 250,000 troops or more - armies that apparently could not move due to, in modern terms, gridlock. No wonder then, after a particularly gloomy telegram from Halleck, Lincoln forwarded it with this note:

"The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck.  It is exceedingly discouraging.  As everywhere else, nothing can be done."

 

NEXT POST: JANUARY 17TH   

More information:

• In Shelby Foote's The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 145-156, is an excellent explanation of what is covered above.