Status - John Baer - 40th Indiana Regiment
On January 13th, 1862 the 40th Indiana was in camp at Bardstown, KY, undergoing familiarization and training for the Army of the Ohio (General Buell commanding).
War Planning
Just before the new year, General McClellan, who was in command of all the armies, was taken sick with what was reported as typhoid fever. President Lincoln took this opportunity to communicate directly with General Buell, and also with General Halleck, who had command in the West.
Halleck was overseeing the area from Western Kentucky to Missouri and anything further west. Missouri was currently the largest area of concern, as there was active fighting and most of Halleck's forces were deployed there. Halleck did not believe he could support a major movement into Kentucky at the time. Also, he did not really trust his general in Kentucky, the not-yet-famous Ulysses. S. Grant.
Lincoln was encouraging Buell to move toward East Tennessee, with an eye to capturing the railroad which was the main northern artery for the Confederacy and a critical supply line for their eastern army, and supporting the Unionists in the area. Buell would give a nod to this but did not actually think it was feasible. This is understandable; even today, driving Interstate 75 between Louisville and Knoxville shows the problem - a long series of high ridges and deep valleys that must be traversed. In a time with no modern roads, and an army that would have to be supplied by wagon trains, success would be doubtful.
Buell much preferred to attack central Kentucky and Middle Tennessee through Bowling Green, KY and Nashville. However, he believed he was facing a larger army than he actually was, and so would not move without the support from General Halleck (which, as above, was not forthcoming due to Halleck's Missouri concerns).
McClellan recovered slowly but a few days later was corresponding again. As is well known, President Lincoln had for some time been prodding McClellan for a forward movement from the eastern army under his command. McClellan, too, seems to have been overestimating the size of the army he was facing, and would not move forward until Buell advanced into East Tennessee and cut the railroad so as to decrease the supplies reaching the Southern army.
We can understand Lincoln's frustration with the state of affairs. Halleck would not move into Kentucky, being occupied with Missouri; Buell would not move into East Tennessee, but he would move into Middle Tennessee if supported by Halleck, but Halleck would not support; McClellan would not go forward without Buell moving into East Tennessee, which Buell would not do.
Lincoln and his cabinet had to find funds to maintain and provision armies of 250,000 troops or more - armies that apparently could not move due to, in modern terms, gridlock. No wonder then, after a particularly gloomy telegram from Halleck, Lincoln forwarded it with this note:
"The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done."
NEXT POST: JANUARY 17TH
More information:
- In Shelby Foote's The Civil War, A Narrative, Vol 1, Fort Sumter to Perryville, pp. 145-156, is an excellent explanation of what is covered above.
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